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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF DEERPARK (HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT), 
Employer, 
-and-
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 363, 
Petitioner. 
On October 12, 1979, the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, Local 363 (petitioner), filed, in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations 
Board, a timely petition for certification as the exclusive 
negotiating representative of certain employees employed by the 
Town of Deerpark Highway Department. 
The parties executed a Consent Agreement wherein they 
stipulated that the negotiating unit would be as follows; 
Included: All full-time and part-time employees 
of the Highway Department, including 
heavy equipment operator, mechanic, 
foreman and assistant foreman. 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent and all other 
employees. 
Pursuant to the Consent Agreement and in order for the 
petitioner to demonstrate its majority status, a secret ballot 
election was held on December 26, 1979. The results of the 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1950 
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election indicate that a majority of eligible voters in the 
] 
stipulated unit do not desire to be represented by the petitioner" 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petition be, and it hereby 
is, DISMISSED. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
January 24, 1980 
"''Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
AJ^O+J^ 
"Ida Klaus , Member 
David 
1 Of the 9 ballots cast, 1 was for and 6 against representation 
by the petitioner. There were 2 challenged ballots, which were 
not sufficient in number to affect the results of the election. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the Application of the 
CITY OF SYRACUSE, 
for a determination pursuant to Section 
212 of the Civil Service Law. 
#2B.-l/25/80 
DOCKET NO. S-0016 
At a meeting of the Public Employment Relations Board held 
on the 24th day of January, 1980, and after consideration of 
the application of the City of Syracuse made pursuant to Section 
212 of the Civil Service Law for a determination that Chapter 30 
of the Revised General Ordinances of the City of Syracuse as 
last amended by General Ordinance: No. 49-1979 is substantially 
equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth in 
Article 14 of the Civil Service Law with respect to the State 
and to the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations 
Board, it is 
ORDERED, that said application..be, and the same hereby is, 
approved upon the determination of the Board that the Ordinance 
aforementioned, as amended, is substantially equivalent to the 
provisions and procedures set forth in Article 14 of the Civil 
Service Law with respect to the State and to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
January 24, 1980 
HAROLD R. NEWMAN, Chairman 
IDA KLAUS, Member 
mm 
DAVID C. "RANDLES, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHEEKTOWAGA CAPTAINS AND LIEUTENANTS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA, 
Charging Party. 
#2c-l/25/80 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3802 
Employer Relations Associates, Inc., 
(Timothy J. Kane, Esq., of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
Sargent, Scibetta & Repka, P.C., 
(Nicholas J. Sargent, Esq., of Counsel), 
for Respondent •-'"_" 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Town of 
Cheektowaga, which is the charging party, to a decision of the 
hearing officer dismissing its charge for lack of prosecution. 
The charge alleges that the Cheektowaga Captains and Lieutenants 
Association improperly insisted upon the negotiation of several 
demands for non-mandatory subjects of negotiation by presenting 
1 
those demands for interest arbitration. 
1 In a related case, the Cheektowaga Captains and Lieutenants 
Association charged the Town of Cheektowaga with a refusal 
to negotiate one of the demands involved in the instant case 
That demand was determined by this Board to be a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. Town of Cheektowaga v. Cheektowaga 
Captains and Lieutenants Association, 12 PERB 113082 (1979). 
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As the issues presented by the charge appear to involve 
primarily a dispute as to scope of negotiations under the Act, the 
hearing officer attempted to expedite disposition of the charge 
by obtaining a stipulation as to the facts. She prepared a stip-
ulation and submitted it to the parties but it was rejected by the 
Town on the ground that it was "inexact". The hearing officer 
then asked the Town to prepare its own stipulation for consider-
ation by the Association, but the Town did not do so. 
Having failed to obtain a stipulation as to the facts, the 
hearing officer scheduled a hearing in Buffalo, New York for the 
afternoon of June 14, 1979. The date and time of the hearing were 
agreed to by both parties. The charging party did not appear at 
the hearing and the hearing officer never received any explana-
tion for its failure to do so. After waiting more than two weeks 
for an explanation, she issued a decision dismissing the petition 
for failure to prosecute. 
In the Town's exceptions, its attorney states that he became 
ill on the night before the hearing and that, upon his awakening 
late the following morning, he telephoned his office and asked 
them to notify the Buffalo office of this Board that he could not 
attend the hearing that afternoon because he was home sick. 
According to the Town's attorney, the Buffalo office of PERB was 
notified, albeit less than two hours before the scheduled hearing, 
that he would be absent because he was ill. 
The information concerning the notice of the attorney's 
absence and the reason therefor was, apparently, never communicatee 
to the hearing officer, but we cannot attribute this failure to the 
Town or its attorney. Moreover, inasmuch as there were a number of 
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admitted telephone conversations between the hearing officer and 
the parties, several of which were not reflected by confirming 
correspondence of either side, we must assume that the absence of 
a written record of the call from the Town's attorney is consistent 
ffith the informal manner in which the parties and the hearing 
Dfficer were communicating with one another. 
Accordingly, we accept the Town attorney's statement that a 
call was made in his behalf to the Buffalo office of PERB informing 
Lt that he could not attend the hearing because of his illness and 
tfe direct that this proceeding be remanded to a hearing officer for 
appropriate processing and disposition pursuant to Part 204 of our 
Rules of Procedure. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the decision of the hearing 
officer be reversed and that this 
proceeding be, and it hereby is, 
remanded to the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representa-
tion for appropriate further proces-
sing and disposition. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
January 24, 1980 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
c^L. / C & ^ c ^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
IMM 
*OiJ-£*S 
David C". Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2D-l/25/80 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1936 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
-and-
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY 
PEACE OFFICERS V BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner. 
WILLIAM E. STRAUB, ESQ. (DAVID F. MIX, ESQ., of Counsel) 
for Employer 
McMAHON & CROTTY (E. JOSEPH GIROUX, JR., ESQ., of 
Counsel) for Petitioner 
On September 4, 1979, the Niagara Frontier Transportation 
Authority Peace Officers' Benevolent Association (Association) 
filed a petition to represent peace officers holding the rank of 
patrolman and sergeant who provide security at airports owned and 
operated by the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (NFTA). 
NFTA is a public benefit corporation under §1299-C(1) of the Publi 
Authorities Law and a public employer within the meaning of the 
Taylor Law. It contracts with Service Systems Corporation (SSC), 
a private corporation, for security services at the airports. 
Earlier in 1979, another union, the International Guards 
Union of America (IGUA) had sought to be certified as the collec-
tive bargaining representative of all regular full-time and part-
time deputized peace officers employed at the NFTA airports. IGUA 
had filed a petition for such employees with the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) and had specified SSC as the employer. 
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After a hearing, the NLRB Regional Director concluded that SSC is 
a joint employer of the peace officers along with NFTA. He further 
concluded that NFTA is an exempt employer under the National Labor 
Relations Act and that, by reason of the joint employer relations::,' 
ship, SSC shares in the statutory exemption enjoyed by NFTA. 
Accordingly, he dismissed the petition. 
The parties agreed that, along with such other documentary 
evidence as they might wish to submit, the record developed in the 
NLRB proceeding would constitute the record in the instant pro-
ceeding. On that record, the Director of Public Employment Prac-
tices and Representation (Director) reached the same conclusion 
as did the Regional Director of the NLRB: SSC and NFTA are a 
joint employer. He further determined that this Board has no 
jurisdiction over the employees of the joint employer because SSC 
is a private entity and PERB has no jurisdiction over a joint 
employer unless each constituent part of the joint employer is 
itself a public employer. 
Both the Association and NFTA have filed exceptions. In 
support of its exceptions, the Association asserts that, for 
Taylor Law purposes, NFTA is the sole employer because it exercises 
sufficient control over the terms and conditions of employment of 
the peace officers to be able to engage in effective collective 
negotiations for them without the participation of SSC. It furthei 
argues that this Board has jurisdiction over the peace officers 
as public employees even if SSC is, as a technical matter, a joint 
employer of them. The test, according to the Association, is 
whether the nature of the employment is unequivocally or substan-
*•• iMMSq 
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1 
tially public and, according to the Association, the record 
demonstrates that this test has been met. The Association contends 
that SSC merely acts as a hiring agent for NFTA and also provides 
bookkeeping and accounting services to NFTA, but that all the 
essential terms and conditions of employment of the peace officers 
are set by NFTA. 
In its cross-exceptions, NFTA asserts that SSC is the 
sole employer of the peace officers who work at its airports. 
DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the record, we determine that NFTA is not 
the sole employer of the peace officers who work at the airports 
that are owned or operated by it. 
SSC is a private corporation that offers food, maintenance 
and security services to both public agencies and private businessejs 
throughout the country. It furnishes services to six enterprises 
in the Buffalo area including NFTA. SSC hires its own personnel 
in this area in accordance with a standard hiring procedure. Per-
sons employed by it are not specifically hired for any particular 
enterprise. They serve as a pool from which SSC assigns individu-
als to the enterprises to perform requested services. SSC retains 
the authority to fire any individual so assigned. NFTA may object 
to an individual assigned to it as a peace officer by SSC, but it 
cannot fire him. If NFTA objects to a particular individual, SSC 
may reas.sign \him to a different enterprise or discharge him. In 
practice, SSC reassigns its employees from account to account as it 
sees fit. 
1 See N.Y. Public Library v. PERB, 37 NY2d 752 (1975). 
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In most positions, newly hired employees are paid the 
minimum wage. A peace officer working at an airport who wants a 
raise must seek it from SSC and not from NFTA. He must also turn 
to SSC if he wishes a promotion to the rank of sergeant. SSC 
consults with NFTA before promoting an employee to the rank of 
sergeant; it does not consult with NFTA before granting a raise. 
SSC also provides fringe benefits to all its employees in the 
Buffalo area, including those who work as peace officers at the 
airports. That program includes hospitalization, life insurance 
and retirement benefits. SSC grants vacation time and it alone 
decides on the vacation schedule of peace officers, subject to its 
obligation to have the appropriate number of peace officers at 
the airports. 
Not all employees who are hired by SSC and work at the 
airports have peace officer status. Some security positions re-
quire that status; others do not. From time to time, SSC proposes 
to NFTA that certain individuals assigned by it to NFTA be given 
peace officer status, because NFTA and not SSC has the le;gal 
authority to grant that status. No employee proposed by SSC for 
that status has ever been refused it by NFTA. 
On these facts, it is clear that SSC exercisesisubstantial 
control over;;the 'terms and conditions -of employment'bO.fLthe.-~p.eace 
officers who work at the airports and-whom the Association seeks 
to represent. Accordingly, we find that SSC is an employer of 
these employees. We further find that their employment is not 
unequivocally or substantially of a public nature. 
In view of these findings, it is unnecessary to address the 
allegation of NFTA that SSC is the sole employer of the peace 
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officers. This Board does not have jurisdiction over the peace 
officers even if NFTA be a joint employer of them along with SSC. 
The jurisdiction of this Board extends to "a joint public employer 
2 
of public employees", but not to employees of a joint employer, 
one part of which is a private entity.. In reaching this conclu-
sion, we adopt the position of Board member Joseph Crowley in New 
York Public Library, 5 PERB 113045 (1972). -His dissenting opinion 
was commented upon favorably by the Appellate Division, New York 
Public Library v. PERB, 45 AD2d 271, 277 (1st Dept., 1975), aff'd 
37 NY2d 752 (1975)., .although the court's holding in that case 
was based upon other grounds. In commenting upon issues before us, 
the Appellate Division stated that this Board's jurisdiction over 
a joint employer "presumes that each of the entities comprising 
the joint public employer be, in its own right, a public employer 
of public employees within the meaning of the Act." 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the petition herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
January 24, 1980 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
*fc^  yt^4~*^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
l!kj<£, 
David C. Randies /Member 
2 CSL §201.6(b) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent, 
-and-
#2E-l/25/80 
BOARD DECISION 
' AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3647 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
THOMAS P. RYAN, ESQ., for Respondent 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (A. MICHAEL WEBER, ESQ. 
and SUSAN JONES, ESQ., of Counsel) for 
Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the United Federation of 
Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT). It alleges that the Board 
of Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(employer) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law in that, without 
prior negotiation with UFT, it directed all its current employees 
who are residents of New York City to continue to reside in the 
City and it informed them that failure to maintain such residence 
1 
would be cause for removal. Many of these employees are in nego-
tiating units represented by UFT, The employer acknowledged that 
it issued a directive requiring current employees who are residents 
of New York City to maintain such residence, but it asserted that 
In its charge, UFT also complained about other conduct of the 
employer relating to employee residency. The hearing officer 
dismissed those aspects of the charge and UFT has not filed 
exceptions to that part of his decision. 
£M Mi b 
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the imposition of such a residency requirement is a management 
prerogative and it was consequently not under a duty to negotiate 
the matter. 
The hearing officer determined that a residency requirement 
for persons who are already working for the employer is a term and 
condition of their employment and that the employer's unilateral 
change violated §209-a.1(d) of the Taylor Law. This matter comes 
to us on the exceptions of the employer to that decision. 
In its exceptions, the employer contends that a residency 
requirement is a prohibited subject of negotiation because, under 
the State Education Law and public policy, it is reserved exclu-
sively for managerial determination. It supports this proposition 
on the authority of two decisions of the New York State Court of 
Appeals in which other matters were held to be reserved for manage-
ment and, therefore, not mandatory subjects of negotiation. In 
Cohoes Central School District v. Cohoes Teachers Association, 
40 NY2d 774 (1976), the Court of Appeals held that a board of edu-
cation could not negotiate away its responsibility for making 
decisions whether to grant or to withhold tenure. In Board of 
Education, Great Neck Union Free School District v. Areman, 
41 NY2d 527 (1977), it held that a board of education could not 
bargain away its authority to inspect teacher files. 
DISCUSSION 
A residency requirement for persons who are already employee 
is a term and condition of employment. Auburn City Unit, CSEA, 
G1.50 
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. • • • 2 
9 PERB 1(3085 (1976). Ordinarily, a term or condition of employment 
is a mandatory subject of negotiation. However, a contrary con-
clusion may follow if it is determined that a particular subject 
matter is excluded from negotiation by the "plain and clear" mean-
ly 
ing of statutory or decisional law, or by the dictates of public 
4 
policy. It is by this rationale that the Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the granting or denial of tenure and the inspection of 
teacher files were not proper subjects for negotiation in its 
5 
Cohoes and Great Neck decisions. 
Similar conclusions have been reached in other jurisdictions. 
Detroit Police Officers Association v. Detroit, 291 Mich.44, 
85 LRRM 2536 (Mich.Sup.Ct., 1974); City of Brookfield v. WERC, 
87 LRRM 2099 (Wise. Cir. Ct.-., 1974); Boston School Teachers 
Committee, 3 MLC 1603 (Mass. Labor Commission, 1977); and 
City School District of Pittsburgh, 9 PPER 1f9618 (Pa. Labor 
Relations Board, 1978). 
3 Syracuse Teachers Association v. Board of Education, 35 NY2d 
743, 744 (1974). : : 
4 Susquehanna Valley School District, 37 NY2d 614 (1975). 
5_ Similarly, we have determined that a residency requirement for 
current employees who were hired subject to such a residency 
requirement is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Salamanca, 12 PERB' 113079 (1979). We reached that conclusion 
because Public Officers Law §30 provides that: 
"Every office shall be vacant upon...the incumbent... 
ceasing to be an inhabitant of the state, or if he be 
a local officer of ,the political subdivision or muni-
cipal corporation of which he is required to be a 
resident when chosen;" (emphasis supplied) 
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In Auburn, supra, we ruled that an employer violates its 
duty to negotiate in good faith when it unilaterally imposes a 
residency requirement upon employees who had not been hired sub-
ject to such a requirement. The employer asks that we reverse our 
decision in Auburn on the theory that the imposition of a resi-
dency requirement upon employees is a management prerogative. 
However, it points to no statute or decision that leaves it to the 
discretion of management whether employees who were not hired sub-
ject to a residency requirement may have a residency requirement 
imposed upon them thereafter. Nor has it advanced any persuasive 
arguments why public policy requires that this subject be deemed 
a management prerogative. We conclude that there is no valid 
basis for departing from our decision in Auburn. The issue before 
us is whether the employer may unilaterally impose a residency 
requirement on current employees. We conclude that it may not do 
so. Its action, which may also infringe upon employees' tenure 
6 
rights^ constitutes a violation of its duty, under the Taylor Law, 
to negotiate in good faith. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the employer to cease and desist 
from imposing upon "current'• 
employees '-within "negotiating • 
units, represented';by' charging 
party' ;.a: requirement of 
6 We also indicated in Auburn that for current employees who 
enjoy tenure, the imposition of a residency requirement would 
violate the statute upon which tenure is based. Thus, the 
employer could not require the employee organization to nego-
tiate as to a residency requirement for such employees. 
Board - U-3647 -5 
DATED: Albany , New York 
J a n u a r y 24 , 1980 
e i t h e r e s t a b l i s h i n g o r m a i n t a i n i n g 
r e s i d e n c y i n t h e C i t y of New York. 
]MA€>>U4u~i^/ 
a r o l d R . N e w m a n , C h a i r m a n 
I d a "Klaus , Member 
./; 
David C . ' R a n d i e s , Mfember 
••icr 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2F-1/25/80 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3804 
GUAZZO, SILAGI, CEANER & PERELSON, P.C. (CAESAR 
C. GUAZZO, ESQ., of Counsel) for Respondent 
HARTMAN & LERNER (HARRY D. HERSH, ESQ., of Counsel) 
for Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association of the City of Long Beach, Inc. (PBA). It alleges 
that the Police Commissioner of the City of Long Beach (City) 
improperly assigned George Voigt, president of the PBA, to a 
walking post on January 23, 1979, in retaliation for the release 
by Voigt, on behalf of PBA, of a statement criticizing the police 
commissioner. The matter comes to us on the exceptions of PBA to 
a decision of the hearing officer dismissing the charge. 
• FACTS 
On January 19, 1979, Voigt, acting in his capacity as 
president of PBA, issued a written statement that was highly 
critical of the Police Commissioner of Long Beach. The statement 
complained that the commissioner had engaged in a "personal ven-
detta" against many patrolmen, several of whom had chosen to leave 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF LONG BEACH, : 
Respondent, 
-and-
PBA OF THE CITY OF LONG BEACH, INC.,: 
Charging Party. 
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the force. It also complained that discipline of police officers 
was enforced by "whim and caprice". Among the many more specific 
complaints was the allegation that police officers were not re-
ceiving adequate training. This statement was mailed to civic 
leaders and to the press and, on January 22, 1979, it became the 
subject of a press conference called by Voigt. The newspapers 
reported the PBA complaints on January 23 and these newspaper 
articles came to the attention of the police commissioner. 
Later that day, Voigt was transferred from his assignment 
as a driver of a two-man patrol car on the 4:00 p.m. to midnight 
shift and was assigned to a walking post. As a senior employee, 
Voigt is rarely assigned to foot patrol. In 1978 he was assigned 
to foot patrol only twice, once on August 4 and once on August 22. 
Voigt had not been assigned to foot patrol in 1979 except on 
January 23, 1979. Post 9, to which Voigt was assigned on 
January 23, 1979, is completely within Post A. Post 9 had not 
been regularly covered since October 3, 1978, and it was not 
covered at all between October 31, 1978, and January 23, 1979. 
It was also not covered in the period immediately after January 
23, 1979. The decision to transfer Voigt from driver of a two-man 
patrol car to Post 9 was made personally by the police commissione 
after he admittedly saw the newspaper articles containing PBA's 
criticism of him. 
The police commissioner testified and explained his action. 
He stated that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on January 23, 1979,he 
received two or three telephone calls warning him that there 
might be a gang war in the vicinity of Post 9 that evening. The 
calls came on his private wire and were, therefore, neither re-
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corded nor noted. They came from people who were known to him, 
but whose identity he could not divulge without compromising 
them. Previously these informants had accurately forecast a 
gang war. 
The instant warning, as well as a standing problem of juven-
ile fights and general vandalism in the area of Post 9, persuaded 
the police commissioner, he said, to fill the post that night. 
The police commissioner testified that he checked the daily roster 
sheet and observed that there was only a single two-man patrol 
car for the 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift and that the car was 
manned by Voigt and Wolstad. He then selected Voigt for Post 9 
because Wblstad was less experienced and was less imposing physi-
cally (Wolstad is about 5'7" and weighs about 125 pounds). Ordi-
narily, assignments are made by Sergeant LaMarca, but LaMarca 
was on vacation on January 23, 1979. Thus, according to the 
police commissioner, he told Lieutenant Chalvein to reassign 
Voigt and he explained to Chalvein the reason for it. As a police 
officer with about twenty-five years' experience, he testified, 
Chalvein could be relied upon to advise Voigt of the trouble that 
the commissioner said he expected at Voigt's post. 
Following the instructions given to him, Lieutenant Chalvein 
did assign Voigt to Post 9. However, according to Voigt, Chalvein 
did not tell him that a gang war was anticipated in the vicinity 
of Post 9. Shaun Dowling, the police officer assigned to Post A, 
testified that he, too, was never told that any particular trouble 
was anticipated at his post on January 23, 1979. He also testi-
fied that there had been no particular increase in crime in the 
vicinity of Post 9 in the days or weeks immediately preceding 
January 23, 1979. 
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The hearing officer found it suspicious that neither Voigt 
nor Dowling was informed of the expected trouble in the vicinity 
of Post 9, but he nevertheless accepted the testimony of the 
police commissioner giving his reasons for the reassignment of 
Voigt. Crediting that, testimony, the hearing officer found that 
Voigt's reassignment was not improperly motivated. 
In its exceptions, PBA argues that the circumstantial ev-
idence supporting a conclusion that Voigt's reassignment was 
improperly motivated is so strong'that the police commissioner-s 
unsupported testimony must, as a matter of law, be rejected. 
. ' DISCUSSION 
We conclude that Voigt was reassigned from a driving post to 
a walking post on January 23, 1979, in retaliation for the issu-
ance of a PBA statement criticizing the police commissioner. In 
reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that the hearing officer 
who heard his testimony believed that the police commissioner 
made the reassignment for a legitimate police-related reason. 
At issue here is the motivation of the police commissioner when 
he reassigned Voigt.and the acceptability; of the reason that he 
gave for that reassignment in light of the surrounding circum-
stances. 
We find the circumstantial evidence to be convincing that 
the reason given by the police commissioner for Voigt's reassign-
ment was a pretext and that his real motive was to retaliate 
against Voigt for the issuance of a statement criticizing him. 
The most compelling circumstances that bring us to this conclu-
sion are: 
& i.O ( 
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1. The timing of the reassignment. It occurred 
on the same day and within hours of the newspaper 
reports of Voigt's criticism of the police com-
missioner. 
2. The infrequency of Voigt's assignment to any 
walking post. 
3. The infrequency of the assignment of any 
police officer to Post 9. 
Thus, the coincidence of a police officer who is rarely given a 
walking post being assigned to a walking post that is rarely 
filled, shortly after the police officer criticized the police 
commissioner, casts suspicion upon the validity of the reason 
given by the police commissioner for his action. These circum-
stances were explained by the police commissioner as deriving 
from two or three warnings received by him that afternoon of 
trouble at Post 9. The commissioner's explanation as to why he 
made no record of so important a series of phone calls is unsatis-
factory. Furthermore, we note that no warning whatsoever was 
transmitted to Voigt or Dowling, the police officers who were 
assigned to the area, by Lieutenant Chalvein concerning antici-
pated trouble in the vicinity of Post 9. That a warning of such 
significance was not transmitted by as experienced an officer as 
Lieutenant Chalvein casts doubt upon the commissioner's testimony 
that he had in fact received such phone calls.. 
Our conclusion that Voigt's reassignment was :in retaliation 
for PBA's criticism of the police commissioner raises the question 
whether the criticism was a protected activity under the Taylor 
Law. We conclude that Voigt's issuance of the critical statement 
was protected because it was issued by Voigt, as president of 
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PBA, and it expressed dissatisfaction with the terms and condi-
tions of employment of the unit employees. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE DETERMINE that the City violated §209-a.l 
(a) and (c) of the Taylor Law in that it interfered with the 
rights of Voigt and discriminated against him because he criti-
cized the police commissioner's treatment of unit employees, and 
WE ORDER the City of Long Beach to cease and desist from 
interfering with, restraining, coercing or dis-
criminating against any of its employees in the 
exercise of rights protected by the Act, and that 
the City conspicuously post a notice in the 
attached form at all locations ordinarily used by 
it for communication with unit personnel. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
January 25, 1980 
Harold R.. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT. TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees that: ' 
We will not interfere with, restrain, coerce 
or discriminate against any of our employees in the 
exercise of rights protected by the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act. 
Employer 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
<o s.yU 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
